Thursday, February 3, 2011

Vannevar Bush; Father of Co-Production?

In the closing months of WWII Vannevar Bush attempted but failed to establish institutions to insure the co-production of publicly funded basic and applied science in post-war America—but why did he fail?   In short, his attempts to preserve the essential ethos of the pre-war world were washed away by a new world created from profound ‘game-changing’ events; such as the dropping of the atomic bomb and the race to develop a guided missile system as its delivery mechanism, all part of a new cold war paradigm. 

 

We are reminded by Carson that, “…postwar American is first and foremost the history of a state of knowledge.”  And that Bush was attempting a kind of social engineering to, “…define and defend a new form of knowledge as well as the mechanisms for its establishment and use.” [1] Here we see Bush as more than attempting to preserve a state of knowledge but to promote the production of new knowledge, and as a social innovator, he intended to design social responsibility as an inherency into the new post-war polity.  In his report to FDR “Science the Endless Frontier”, Bush, “…postulates a form of knowledge, basic research, which is the essential tonic for economic growth and national security”. [1]   Although his reasons for emphasizing basic research is not fully apparent as stated in the SEF report, he later explains how basic and independent research is vital to the preservation of democracy in his post-war book, discussed below. 

 

As the war drew to an end and world events developed, Bush himself realized the need to maintain the government’s connection to scientific research for several reasons.  The Allies had bombed much of Europe back into the stone age (so to speak), especially Germany which was the primary producer of innovation prior to the war, thus, “…destroy[ing] the previous sources of academic research in Western Europe”.  “[I]t was now incumbent upon the government to support such research in American universities”. [1] It was also the will of FDR to, “…weld science and technology to the long-term survival of the nation through the development and use of nuclear weapons” [1], therefore initiating the nations commitment to the coming cold war. 

 

Overall, Bush’s major objective was not to preserve the past for past’s sake.  Rather he wished to preserve a way of life he thought essential for American democracy.  The title of his book “Modern Arms and Free Men”, as stated by Carson, implies a question—“can a democracy have both?”  This points out a very important dilemma, one that was later eluded to in President Eisenhower’s fair well speech, warning of the “Military Industrial Complex” and its threat to democracy.  Bush’s book is a “discussion of the role of science in preserving democracy where he explained his fears that “America might become more like its enemy” where, “…Bush identified this belief with the Soviet system and its ideology of world domination.” [1] It is said that technology becomes ideological when it is chosen over other more workable technologies.  Surely the immense expenditures on nuclear arms during the cold war is proof of this?

 

Bush also points out, “…the Soviet system rested upon a false understanding that science was all there was to know”.  According to Carson, Bush argued that the democratic polity, in contrast to Communism, “…drew a different lesson from the past, one about the limits of scientific reasoning and the need to believe in the possibility of change.” [1]  Bush’s main assertion was that a democratic state should, “…recognized that science was not the only way of knowing nor the scientist necessarily the best qualified to understand all dimensions of the world.” [1]  Hence the statement, “Innovation is far too important to be left to scientists and technologists. It is also far too important to be left to economists or social scientists.” [2]  Here we see an often underemphasized interpretation of Bush’s concept of basic research as a, “…source of a new faith that would produce novelty — novelties that might find use in weapons or defenses, but also novelties that might break the ‘pattern of sordid strife’”. [1]  In Bush’s view, the preservation of institutions of independent basic scientific research is equivalent to the preservation of American democracy.  How might this apply to the current context?—What do you think?   

 

Incidentally, in Carson’s account of pre-war developments he points out, “The Science Advisory ‘Board operated under the belief that the crisis of the thirties demanded a restructuring the university around specific technical problems transcending disciplinary boundaries.” [1]  Here we apparently see the inception of a new social innovation; interdisciplinary studies!  

 

 

1)     John Carson, The Science of Merit and the Merit of Science: Mental and Social Order in Early 20th Century United States and France

2)    Freeman, C. (1974), The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books

 

1 comment:

  1. Very well written summary of Carson! In regards to the final discussion on basic research and American democracy. It was emphasized several times throughout this piece how Bush thoughts scientists would not be interested in doing military-type research after the war ends and related research institutions go away. In today's research environment where funding seems to reign, this belief almost seems naive!

    Does the belief that supporting basic research is as important as American democracy still stand today (assuming that Bush was right back then)? Much of basic research today requires large investments to grow beyond the drafting tables (money, education, time, physical material, etc). And, how much of the basic research going on today will the "common-man" actually see put in use and use it? I'm not undermining the importance of basic research. I'm just trying to understand where Bush saw the direct connection.

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