Jasanoff’s Designs on Nature studies and attempts to answer primarily one overarching question: Why and how do various Western countries, that largely share common political ideologies, economic systems, worldviews, and technological innovations, choose to govern emerging technologies in divergent ways? To answer this, Jasanoff builds upon many of the previous readings from this class and explores the decision- and knowledge-making institutions tasked with creating regulatory, ontological, ethical, epistemological, legal, and other frameworks to accommodate expansions in technology. Working through the lens of biotechnologies, Jasanoff illuminates the history behind biotechnology knowledge-making in the US, UK, and Germany, and contrasts the apparatuses in each state to arrive at a theory of civic epistemologies, the ‘institutionalized practices by which members of a given society test and deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for making collective choices’ (255).
In her analysis, Jasanoff does explore how international institutions (the EU) shape emerging technology knowledge-making, but the focus is primarily on national approaches and leaves much of the development, and possible future development, of international approaches unexplored. Although I wouldn’t consider this a weakness of her analysis, international knowledge-making is very likely to become more important over time with the continued dimunition of the national state as the agent of primary importance. While likely to influence and shape much of the international debate on responsible, safe, and ethical uses of biotechnologies, these three states do share common cultural, linguistic, and developmental roots. Although this does allow for a more nuanced analysis of their respective knowledge-making apparatuses (allowing one to gloss over the potentially major differences one encounters in comparing states of widely different cultures and histories), it does leave out an analysis of other very important civic epistemologies, like those in East Asia and South Asia. Again, I don’t consider this a weakness of Designs on Nature, but carrying this type of analysis further necessitates the investigation of these alternate epistemologies.
Japan, for instance, has a model largely consistent with Germany’s consensus-seeking model, although arguably less efficient and less government-focused. Japan’s bureaucratic leaders operate largely independent from the elected government, seeking to build consensus in a behind-the-scenes fashion with predominately corporate interests. This has led to accusations of undemocratic-ness and non-inclusiveness in the way the Japanese government pursues policymaking, which has only recently begun seeing changes. Studying Japan using the methodology Jasanoff outlines in Designs, with Germany as the comparison, would yield interesting insight into how a potentially major influencer of international emerging technology epistemology would go about forming its legal, ethical, and social stances. (Comparing Public Policies – Adolino & Blake)
And although Jasanoff does take care to show how political considerations can influence the formation of knowledge claims in each of these states, a slightly more thorough analysis of this point would also yield substantial insight. Speaking from the perspective of a political scientist, the distribution of political resources and the intentions of the actors within a structure substantially influence the direction that a given policy takes. Although structure is very important (and very probably the most important aspect of a political system), the old considerations of ‘who gets what, when, and how’ as decided by agents still influences the formation of knowledge claims.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Knowledge and Identity are Power
Where previous weeks’ authors have emphasized difference influences behind the incorporation of science and technology into society (or visa versa), Jasonoff takes a slight different approach in her booked Designs on Nature. Civic epistemology is key in her view to understand the interplay between the public assessment of risk, institutions’ role in governance, and the expectation in how state, public, institutions, and science relate to each other—who participates in addition to how and who doesn’t participate.
As stated in the book, science is a deregulated commercial product in US (authority of science). Biotechnology is framed as a product of progress while nature exists for human use. This focus closed many ethical and moral debates; this lack of politics made it appear that there was general acceptance about such policies. Biotechnology in Europe is framed leading to the differences of institutions and relationships. Biotechnology in Europe is seen as needing special public concern along side of a general trust in empirical demonstrations. History has limited the creditability of state’s experience and expertise. Yet, there is even differences between EU member states: Britain focuses on experience (science through legitimate, authorized experts speaking for the people) while Germany focuses on institutional rationality.
Yet, it is interesting how these civic epistemologies are manipulated and used for the benefit of the some. As stated by Jasonoff, “Science cultures are at one and the same time political cultures.” One reason for this given for this is that economic and political powers are increasingly tied to science and technology, threatening science’s impartiality. Additionally, biotechnology policy is commonly embedded in national building and identity. Diagnostic technology creates the wanted inner group and hopes to keep them alive and healthy—just as biometric technology is used to keep the unwanted outside. A technology or science can then be seen as an object of a state identity that leads to quotes like: “Resistance to biotechnology became almost a surrogate for resisting America’s imperial power.”
Nevertheless, all of this is based on creation of knowledge as a resource—whether that knowledge is natural or imported. As many countries moved away from resource based economies, information became the new basis of power and growth. This search of knowledge has shaped economies and public policies in a wide range of areas, but this transition is not smooth. How difference societies have reacted to this bumpy road has lead to the comparative differences observed. Political authority to acquire and use this knowledge needs to come from somewhere and it comes from the immunities and consents of those governed. Furthermore, Ulrich Beck, in Risk Society, described how society is influenced by risk by choosing good risks over bad risks and predicting outcomes, which involves a plethora of information.
What Jasonoff adds to this discourse is giving power to national identity. Last week’s authors discussed the constitutions of a nation/people. Brown discussed the ideas of representation and democracy. National identity, though embedded in these ideas, plays a minor role. Jasonoff bring them back into the forefront.
As stated in the book, science is a deregulated commercial product in US (authority of science). Biotechnology is framed as a product of progress while nature exists for human use. This focus closed many ethical and moral debates; this lack of politics made it appear that there was general acceptance about such policies. Biotechnology in Europe is framed leading to the differences of institutions and relationships. Biotechnology in Europe is seen as needing special public concern along side of a general trust in empirical demonstrations. History has limited the creditability of state’s experience and expertise. Yet, there is even differences between EU member states: Britain focuses on experience (science through legitimate, authorized experts speaking for the people) while Germany focuses on institutional rationality.
Yet, it is interesting how these civic epistemologies are manipulated and used for the benefit of the some. As stated by Jasonoff, “Science cultures are at one and the same time political cultures.” One reason for this given for this is that economic and political powers are increasingly tied to science and technology, threatening science’s impartiality. Additionally, biotechnology policy is commonly embedded in national building and identity. Diagnostic technology creates the wanted inner group and hopes to keep them alive and healthy—just as biometric technology is used to keep the unwanted outside. A technology or science can then be seen as an object of a state identity that leads to quotes like: “Resistance to biotechnology became almost a surrogate for resisting America’s imperial power.”
Nevertheless, all of this is based on creation of knowledge as a resource—whether that knowledge is natural or imported. As many countries moved away from resource based economies, information became the new basis of power and growth. This search of knowledge has shaped economies and public policies in a wide range of areas, but this transition is not smooth. How difference societies have reacted to this bumpy road has lead to the comparative differences observed. Political authority to acquire and use this knowledge needs to come from somewhere and it comes from the immunities and consents of those governed. Furthermore, Ulrich Beck, in Risk Society, described how society is influenced by risk by choosing good risks over bad risks and predicting outcomes, which involves a plethora of information.
What Jasonoff adds to this discourse is giving power to national identity. Last week’s authors discussed the constitutions of a nation/people. Brown discussed the ideas of representation and democracy. National identity, though embedded in these ideas, plays a minor role. Jasonoff bring them back into the forefront.
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Thompson Generalized
Thompson’s exploration of technology’s effect on privacy is interesting to say the least. Using reproductive technologies as her focus, she charts her way through the myriad interactions that naturally flow from an attempt to understand an incredibly complex topic melded with an incredibly complex technology with potentially far-reaching implications.
Whereas I fundamentally agree with her assertion that the various aspects of reproductive privacy she explores ‘suggests that the biomedical and life sciences need to be integrated into political philosophy in a way that goes beyond how science and technology are generally discussed in relationship to democracy, agency, and social order’(212), I’m not entirely convinced that its inclusion should be done at the exclusion of other types of disruptive technologies. Indeed, two of the three aspects of privacy that she explores in the piece (autonomous scientific research and the private sector) are intrinsic to all large-scale scientific enterprises in this country. One can always ask of any technology, “how much of a role should government have in regulating it?” and “how does the activity and characteristics of the private sector influence its use?” Reproductive privacy, the third aspect of privacy that she examines in the article, can be slightly altered depending on which technology one examines – one could speak of financial privacy, or behavioral privacy, or any other permutation of privacy that is infringed by any certain technology.
In a sense, I’m arguing that Thompson doesn’t give herself enough credit concerning the applicability of her framework to other, particularly emerging, technologies.: all three of the above aspects of privacy could be applied, with a little massaging, to, for instance, social media privacy. There are questions concerning the rights of the state to interfere with the exchanges of information inherent in social medias (private sector privacy), questions regarding what kinds of data mining techniques should be developed and applied (autonomous research), and questions regarding the current state of electronic privacy and the usefulness of prior conceptions of privacy on the Internet in general (Internet privacy). Her framework could be more powerful than she herself indicates.
Her ‘monopoly of desperation’ (240) explanation is very interesting, and I wonder how similar this is, in some respects, to Jasanoff’s co-production. A full analysis is way beyond the scope of this blog post, but I can’t help but think there may be at least some surface similarities. In Thompson’s conception, the monopoly of desperation is created by the consumer of reproductive technologies as their demands are met by the providers of that technology. In turn, consumer demands are shaped by the technologies and techniques of reproduction available at the time. This negotiation between what is wanted and what is provided, and the change that proceeds from the two, shares similarities with societal coproduction, albeit as a microcosm of coproduction’s macrocosm. From a selection of technologies, Thompson’s reproductive consumers make their choice, and their choices determine the progression of technological innovation.
Thompson’s unwillingness to reach beyond her specific chosen technology is understandable in light of her research interests (and probably the constraints that the editors placed on her chapter), but there’s a lot of good material here I’d like to see pressed forward a bit more.
Whereas I fundamentally agree with her assertion that the various aspects of reproductive privacy she explores ‘suggests that the biomedical and life sciences need to be integrated into political philosophy in a way that goes beyond how science and technology are generally discussed in relationship to democracy, agency, and social order’(212), I’m not entirely convinced that its inclusion should be done at the exclusion of other types of disruptive technologies. Indeed, two of the three aspects of privacy that she explores in the piece (autonomous scientific research and the private sector) are intrinsic to all large-scale scientific enterprises in this country. One can always ask of any technology, “how much of a role should government have in regulating it?” and “how does the activity and characteristics of the private sector influence its use?” Reproductive privacy, the third aspect of privacy that she examines in the article, can be slightly altered depending on which technology one examines – one could speak of financial privacy, or behavioral privacy, or any other permutation of privacy that is infringed by any certain technology.
In a sense, I’m arguing that Thompson doesn’t give herself enough credit concerning the applicability of her framework to other, particularly emerging, technologies.: all three of the above aspects of privacy could be applied, with a little massaging, to, for instance, social media privacy. There are questions concerning the rights of the state to interfere with the exchanges of information inherent in social medias (private sector privacy), questions regarding what kinds of data mining techniques should be developed and applied (autonomous research), and questions regarding the current state of electronic privacy and the usefulness of prior conceptions of privacy on the Internet in general (Internet privacy). Her framework could be more powerful than she herself indicates.
Her ‘monopoly of desperation’ (240) explanation is very interesting, and I wonder how similar this is, in some respects, to Jasanoff’s co-production. A full analysis is way beyond the scope of this blog post, but I can’t help but think there may be at least some surface similarities. In Thompson’s conception, the monopoly of desperation is created by the consumer of reproductive technologies as their demands are met by the providers of that technology. In turn, consumer demands are shaped by the technologies and techniques of reproduction available at the time. This negotiation between what is wanted and what is provided, and the change that proceeds from the two, shares similarities with societal coproduction, albeit as a microcosm of coproduction’s macrocosm. From a selection of technologies, Thompson’s reproductive consumers make their choice, and their choices determine the progression of technological innovation.
Thompson’s unwillingness to reach beyond her specific chosen technology is understandable in light of her research interests (and probably the constraints that the editors placed on her chapter), but there’s a lot of good material here I’d like to see pressed forward a bit more.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Technological Citizenship
In this post, I will advance an explanation of the differences between law and technology, and how ordinary people can reclaim control over their lives through what I refer to as “technological citizenship.”
The modern liberal state is defined by the rule of law, a fair and evenhanded treatment of all people according to clear rules. The most basic laws are constitutional, those that define the relationship between the parts of government, and government and the citizens. In democracies, and particularly in America, the Constitution has been carefully designed to allow for citizenship and participation in the law-making process. The Federalist papers debated and discovered how abstract principles like liberty and justice could be translated into the concrete institutions of policy, and despite occasional hiccups, and one major war, their framework endures today.
But laws are only half the story. The world is also full of technologies, and as Langdon Winner points out in The Whale and the Reactor, our technological constitution, the core systems for providing food, shelter, power, mobility, etc are not nearly as well-designed as the law. While the Constitution and the law grew through a process of considered debate and democratic input, technologies have accreted over time into centralized bureaucratic systems, operating according to a depersonalizing logic of efficient markets. For Langdon Winner, the power and omnipresence of these technological systems is a grave threat to democracy and liberty, as society become dependent on entities which are essentially autonomous from public control.
The democratic person is a political citizen, taking an active role in the process of governance by becoming informed on the issues, voting, communicating with their representatives and their neighbors. Our ideal of democracy remains ancient Athens (albiet with an updated version of who counts as a citizen), where every citizen participated equally in government, and positions were rotated regularly. The technological person is a consumer, and the end goal of technology is the 'utilitization' of everything, technologies becoming absolutely reliable, simple, and omnipresent. The more advanced a technology is, the fewer buttons, access panels, and failure modes it has; compare an early computer like ENIAC to an iPad. The best realized vision of this phenomenon is E.M. Forester's “The Machine Stops”, where planetary civilization is controlled by an immense computer system that is beyond the understanding of its inhabitants.
Now, reverse these roles. A political consumer is an unthinking, uncritical clod who unquestioningly obeys the dictates of The Party, whatever The Party might be. Political consumers are poison to democracy. But what is the technological citizen? By analogy, the technological citizen is somebody who takes an active stance towards technology, who is informed about the features and full scope of a given device or system, is prepared to think critically about the implications of that technology, and is not afraid to transform, adopt, or abandon technologies as alternatives become available. My friends at HeatSync Labs are great examples of technological citizens, actively experimenting with and adapting emerging technologies, and their lives have certainly been made richer through their close understanding of technology.
The challenge is therefore encouraging this new mode of technological citizenship. This will not be easy, citizenship demands deep, continuous engagement, (and political citizenship is on the decline in this country as well). And more and more technologies are becoming utilities, slick services that non-specialists can't even view, let alone think critically about. But conversely, with the internet, the cost of gaining expert technical knowledge is falling. As devices become smarter, making it easier to communicate with and analyze them should become a priority, such as a SmartGrid technology that tracks home energy usage room by room, device by device. Finally, education is a vital part of citizenship, and technological toys that are just visible enough should be developed to teach relevant skills, like computer programming, design and architecture, and ecosystems thinking. Personally, I've always been disappointed that Lego Mindstorms came out just after I lost interest in Lego; it would have made me a much better engineer. While developing technological citizenship is not easy, technological citizens will find it far easier to adapt and live in the future, and as partisan politics becomes increasing rancorous and alienating, technological citizenship may provide a new space for civic action and social development.
The modern liberal state is defined by the rule of law, a fair and evenhanded treatment of all people according to clear rules. The most basic laws are constitutional, those that define the relationship between the parts of government, and government and the citizens. In democracies, and particularly in America, the Constitution has been carefully designed to allow for citizenship and participation in the law-making process. The Federalist papers debated and discovered how abstract principles like liberty and justice could be translated into the concrete institutions of policy, and despite occasional hiccups, and one major war, their framework endures today.
But laws are only half the story. The world is also full of technologies, and as Langdon Winner points out in The Whale and the Reactor, our technological constitution, the core systems for providing food, shelter, power, mobility, etc are not nearly as well-designed as the law. While the Constitution and the law grew through a process of considered debate and democratic input, technologies have accreted over time into centralized bureaucratic systems, operating according to a depersonalizing logic of efficient markets. For Langdon Winner, the power and omnipresence of these technological systems is a grave threat to democracy and liberty, as society become dependent on entities which are essentially autonomous from public control.
The democratic person is a political citizen, taking an active role in the process of governance by becoming informed on the issues, voting, communicating with their representatives and their neighbors. Our ideal of democracy remains ancient Athens (albiet with an updated version of who counts as a citizen), where every citizen participated equally in government, and positions were rotated regularly. The technological person is a consumer, and the end goal of technology is the 'utilitization' of everything, technologies becoming absolutely reliable, simple, and omnipresent. The more advanced a technology is, the fewer buttons, access panels, and failure modes it has; compare an early computer like ENIAC to an iPad. The best realized vision of this phenomenon is E.M. Forester's “The Machine Stops”, where planetary civilization is controlled by an immense computer system that is beyond the understanding of its inhabitants.
Now, reverse these roles. A political consumer is an unthinking, uncritical clod who unquestioningly obeys the dictates of The Party, whatever The Party might be. Political consumers are poison to democracy. But what is the technological citizen? By analogy, the technological citizen is somebody who takes an active stance towards technology, who is informed about the features and full scope of a given device or system, is prepared to think critically about the implications of that technology, and is not afraid to transform, adopt, or abandon technologies as alternatives become available. My friends at HeatSync Labs are great examples of technological citizens, actively experimenting with and adapting emerging technologies, and their lives have certainly been made richer through their close understanding of technology.
The challenge is therefore encouraging this new mode of technological citizenship. This will not be easy, citizenship demands deep, continuous engagement, (and political citizenship is on the decline in this country as well). And more and more technologies are becoming utilities, slick services that non-specialists can't even view, let alone think critically about. But conversely, with the internet, the cost of gaining expert technical knowledge is falling. As devices become smarter, making it easier to communicate with and analyze them should become a priority, such as a SmartGrid technology that tracks home energy usage room by room, device by device. Finally, education is a vital part of citizenship, and technological toys that are just visible enough should be developed to teach relevant skills, like computer programming, design and architecture, and ecosystems thinking. Personally, I've always been disappointed that Lego Mindstorms came out just after I lost interest in Lego; it would have made me a much better engineer. While developing technological citizenship is not easy, technological citizens will find it far easier to adapt and live in the future, and as partisan politics becomes increasing rancorous and alienating, technological citizenship may provide a new space for civic action and social development.
Solar Energy and Social Organization
I couldn't help but bite at the questions Winner leaves open at the close of his third chapter: "Techne and Politeia". argues that instead of building a socio-technical system first, and subsequently worry about it's implications, that we should instead evaluate these technologies as much as possible beforehand based on their inherent qualities. Winner, writing in 1986, asks many questions regarding the future of solar energy, including: "How large should such systems be? How many will be built? Who should own them? How should they be managed? Should they be automatic? Or should the producer/consumer of solar power be actively involved in activities of load management?" (57)
Forecasting, Winner argues that this is a chance to incorporate personal responsibility into energy generation through distributed generation (DG) primarily in the form of rooftop photo-voltaic installations. He suggests that what will most likely occur is business as usual with large scale centralized plants feeding power into the grid like a coal-based, or nuclear plant would, remaining in control of the utility companies. He says that other values besides the “efficiency worshipper” mentality should be assessed when investigating new energy sources. What he doesn’t touch on are the vested interests of the utility companies, namely, reliability. I have written about Bill Post in a previous blog entry, but this sentiment was echoed at a seminar with folks from the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) this week. Instead of shunning DG, they took it to be a matter of fact for the future in some capacity and argued that it would behoove the utility community to think about ways of integrating consumer based generation into the grid system before the mix increases.
In a discussion today with a former member of the Arizona Corporation Commission (our elected regulatory body for public utilities), I inquired about the REST law and the DG component. I hate to take up room explaining it, but it goes something like this. AZ must include 15% of renewable energy to their total portfolio by 2025. Of this 15%, 30% must come from DG sources by 2012. (for information about this and incentives, check out this great site: http://www.dsireusa.org/) This ramp up of distributed sources is very aggressive, and does not incentivize utilities investing beyond this percentage point. I asked why this number was not left open, or allowed for more flexibility in the mix of renewables. My answer was simply it was a quibble on the bench between commissioners and it needed to be decided… not quite the satisfactory answer, but illustrates the sometimes complex, sometimes to the point way in which decisions get made. While there are some fairly ambitious standards for DG, the fact remains that the easiest way to meet the REST requirements is through large scale plants (on the order of 17+ Megawatts as opposed to 1-2 Kw for household DG and more for other entities depending on their size).
The point of all this is that solar (and renewables in general) have evolved into a mixed bag energy source which demands that we look at both centralized and decentralized manifestations. While DG certainly has the chance to become a source of personal consumer responsibility, many issues remain in terms of cost, interconnectivity (making sure that the energy produced by citizens can be fed back into the grid at a favorable rate and ensuring that the infrastructure is up to date), and convincing certain players that the energy system will be changing very soon. The management of these systems is diverse, from large scale solar arrays by utility companies, to third party solar “leasers,” to fully engaged citizens managing their own installations. In this sense, Winner’s either/or analysis misses the current trajectory developing in renewable energy systems. DG requires that energy companies relinquish absolute control of the energy source and allow multiple actors to contribute.
It is clear through the past semester that the at least some people making these decisions (in industry, government, academia) are well aware of DG as a complicated component of our future energy supply. Changing the assumptions of engineers about how energy is delivered to the customer are key. Convincing utilities to invest in distributed energy is in everybody’s best interest. While foresight is desirable, technical systems have a tendency to produce unintended consequences (though people are constantly formulating decisions along the way). I would like to say more but feel I am not being very eloquent at the moment.
Forecasting, Winner argues that this is a chance to incorporate personal responsibility into energy generation through distributed generation (DG) primarily in the form of rooftop photo-voltaic installations. He suggests that what will most likely occur is business as usual with large scale centralized plants feeding power into the grid like a coal-based, or nuclear plant would, remaining in control of the utility companies. He says that other values besides the “efficiency worshipper” mentality should be assessed when investigating new energy sources. What he doesn’t touch on are the vested interests of the utility companies, namely, reliability. I have written about Bill Post in a previous blog entry, but this sentiment was echoed at a seminar with folks from the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) this week. Instead of shunning DG, they took it to be a matter of fact for the future in some capacity and argued that it would behoove the utility community to think about ways of integrating consumer based generation into the grid system before the mix increases.
In a discussion today with a former member of the Arizona Corporation Commission (our elected regulatory body for public utilities), I inquired about the REST law and the DG component. I hate to take up room explaining it, but it goes something like this. AZ must include 15% of renewable energy to their total portfolio by 2025. Of this 15%, 30% must come from DG sources by 2012. (for information about this and incentives, check out this great site: http://www.dsireusa.org/) This ramp up of distributed sources is very aggressive, and does not incentivize utilities investing beyond this percentage point. I asked why this number was not left open, or allowed for more flexibility in the mix of renewables. My answer was simply it was a quibble on the bench between commissioners and it needed to be decided… not quite the satisfactory answer, but illustrates the sometimes complex, sometimes to the point way in which decisions get made. While there are some fairly ambitious standards for DG, the fact remains that the easiest way to meet the REST requirements is through large scale plants (on the order of 17+ Megawatts as opposed to 1-2 Kw for household DG and more for other entities depending on their size).
The point of all this is that solar (and renewables in general) have evolved into a mixed bag energy source which demands that we look at both centralized and decentralized manifestations. While DG certainly has the chance to become a source of personal consumer responsibility, many issues remain in terms of cost, interconnectivity (making sure that the energy produced by citizens can be fed back into the grid at a favorable rate and ensuring that the infrastructure is up to date), and convincing certain players that the energy system will be changing very soon. The management of these systems is diverse, from large scale solar arrays by utility companies, to third party solar “leasers,” to fully engaged citizens managing their own installations. In this sense, Winner’s either/or analysis misses the current trajectory developing in renewable energy systems. DG requires that energy companies relinquish absolute control of the energy source and allow multiple actors to contribute.
It is clear through the past semester that the at least some people making these decisions (in industry, government, academia) are well aware of DG as a complicated component of our future energy supply. Changing the assumptions of engineers about how energy is delivered to the customer are key. Convincing utilities to invest in distributed energy is in everybody’s best interest. While foresight is desirable, technical systems have a tendency to produce unintended consequences (though people are constantly formulating decisions along the way). I would like to say more but feel I am not being very eloquent at the moment.
Socio-technical path dependencies
I like the concept of techno-industrial order and how it is identified so well by Winner and Parthasarathy. While Winner goes through the historical progression of this thought process, and introduces the concept of inanimate artifacts having inherent politics, Parthasarathy writes about the competing systems of medicine in the USA and the UK. This artifacts and their supporting networks do indeed have politics, as well as momentum and a codified structure that gives momentum to certain pathways. We can view the energy industry through this filter and gain some insights about the power in a metaphorical sense, in addition to the generation, movement, and use of electrons over grids.
For instance, the European philosophies of dealing with energy are quite different from the American point of view. In Europe, the land has been distributed and put to use in ways that have a lot more path dependence than the relatively young United States. They have fought over land and resources for hundreds of years and some boundaries in eastern Europe are still fungeable. When electrification came to that continent it played out differently than in the US and the modern inclinations reflect that history.
An example is rural electrification. Individual European countries such as the Netherlands embraced the ideology of rural electrification as serving a wider national public good. The pace of rural electrification was fairly quick and expansive. By contrast, electrification in the United States occurred at a much faster pace in the cities and only slowly in the rural areas. It was expensive and the privatization of electric companies (utilities, in today’s parlance), while offering innovation, also set up a landscape where profit had to be given equal consideration to other public goods.
Those two differing mindsets play out in today’s energy markets in similar ways. Europe has been quick to pick up on renewable technologies, such as Solar in Germany and Wind in the UK and Netherlands, while the US has deliberated over the very desirability of these technologies and who is going to pay for them. Our mixed system of private and publicly funded infrastructure now is an immense patchwork of multi-owner, multi-regulated cables, towers and generating plants. The concept of distributed power is a very real threat to the funding structure and the philosophical stability of the Utilities. Thus, it is not given the same serious consideration or institutional support as in Europe. While the Europeans have been quick to fund such projects as part of the public good, the US is still debating and may be doing so for some time. This is how power and institutions have inherent political leanings.
Socio- technological constitutions
Socio- technological constitutions
The construction of relations between science/technology and society overtime challenges the architecture of policy when decisions are to be made. Passing laws and practicing polices is influenced by a set of practices in the domain of 3 dimensions: first the direct individual construction of technology (the way we relate to science in our daily lives), second the infrastructure that commands that relation (constitutions, norms, values, etc) and third the emergence of difference in the former two.
This entire idea of a philosophy of technology is relevant to dissect the mechanisms of democracy processes. Winners argues that citizens are to be much more engaged with the decisions. Awareness is the difference between political consumption and positive “active ” citizenship. This been the case, there is a larger analysis to be done related to the manner we control the origin of any technology, meaning how society have a given approach to solve problems relying on the use of technology. The architecture of this socio-technological relation between people and the so called artifacts is defiantly politicized, in the sense that this metabolism guides and constrains but does not determines the potential outcomes of technology.
Democracy as a power to solve problems is always related to conflicts that are at the same time embedded in technological/industrial orders, this fact remains to be addressed within the lines of efficiency and modernity. These key components for the construction of technocratic and material experiences are unquestionably present in the formulation of policy and eventually crystalized on public interactions. Parthasarathy gives a clear example when comparing the development of genetic testing for breast cancer between the UK and the US underlying that, as mentioned earlier, these three dimensions of socio-technological are contingent with the ability to solve problems, or in the case of this example to provide a construction sound enough for the public to use this studies. This is again a matter of power related to the way technology is presented to the “demos” based on the infrastructure that is to be accessed by users of the system and that will eventually reshape the emergent new conducts and technologies available.
The construction of relations between science/technology and society overtime challenges the architecture of policy when decisions are to be made. Passing laws and practicing polices is influenced by a set of practices in the domain of 3 dimensions: first the direct individual construction of technology (the way we relate to science in our daily lives), second the infrastructure that commands that relation (constitutions, norms, values, etc) and third the emergence of difference in the former two.
This entire idea of a philosophy of technology is relevant to dissect the mechanisms of democracy processes. Winners argues that citizens are to be much more engaged with the decisions. Awareness is the difference between political consumption and positive “active ” citizenship. This been the case, there is a larger analysis to be done related to the manner we control the origin of any technology, meaning how society have a given approach to solve problems relying on the use of technology. The architecture of this socio-technological relation between people and the so called artifacts is defiantly politicized, in the sense that this metabolism guides and constrains but does not determines the potential outcomes of technology.
Democracy as a power to solve problems is always related to conflicts that are at the same time embedded in technological/industrial orders, this fact remains to be addressed within the lines of efficiency and modernity. These key components for the construction of technocratic and material experiences are unquestionably present in the formulation of policy and eventually crystalized on public interactions. Parthasarathy gives a clear example when comparing the development of genetic testing for breast cancer between the UK and the US underlying that, as mentioned earlier, these three dimensions of socio-technological are contingent with the ability to solve problems, or in the case of this example to provide a construction sound enough for the public to use this studies. This is again a matter of power related to the way technology is presented to the “demos” based on the infrastructure that is to be accessed by users of the system and that will eventually reshape the emergent new conducts and technologies available.
Thursday, March 24, 2011
A technology's architecture: who win and who loose
Parthasarathy (2005) introduces a technology’s of architecture (TA) which is “made up of components (for example, steel beams and concrete) and specific ways in which these components are fitted together to fulfill specific functions” (Parthasarathy 2005, 7). He describes a conceptual framework of TA in order to analyze the testing system which discovers genes linked to inherited susceptibility for breast and ovarian cancer (BRCA genes). The testing system must, he claims, have “(1) direct individuals to testing, (2) assess their eligibility, (3) inform them about potential risks, (4) benefits, (5) implications of the test, (6) extract material or information for testing by a technical apparatus, and (7) report the results (Parthasarathy 2005, 7).”
Let me begin with the first component, “direct individuals to testing”. Depending on culture and specific kind of test, directing method may be different, he argues. In my view, the actual directing individuals, in testing system of BRCA, is done by neither newspaper advertisement nor an advice of physician. Directing, in my opinion, is done by (1) having insurance and (2) coverage of the insurance especially in US. If a citizen has a health insurance policy, it is likely that she will see her provider who is likely to suggest the test. If a citizen does not have health insurance, it is likely that she will see her provider and there is no possibility of assessing her risks.
Second, who access the users’ eligibility? Providers may suggest the test. However, the suggestion does not matter if the patient does not have health insurance. The eligibility to access the test is finally determined by the insurance company of the patient. There are many loopholes in implementation and executing health insurance policy. Insurance companies have sole authority to deny a claim for many reasons. For example, if an insured person did not disclose pre-existing conditions, he or she can be denied for coverage. For those who do not have health insurance, either being poor or having some other reasons, they have no rights to access the test. You may argue that those who do not have health insurance are finally ended up at emergency rooms and they could still get care and treatment. However, I would say, emergency rooms do not provide the BRCA test, in most cases because it is not emergency nature.
Since the first two components that are influenced by external factors (health insurance policy, and authority rested at the hands of those insurance companies), all the components in the system does not fit and work properly together. In fact, the technology was innovated for the entire sake of patients, end users. However, their luck for having access to the technology or test depends too much on the external factors. No matter what factors influence the eligibility of a patient, the company which invested in the technology has reaped the profits. The insurance companies get huge profits from denying care for patients. Parthasarathy’s (2005) view does not include (1) equal distribution of wealth, (2) affordability and (3) accessibility to the healthcare in a bigger picture. His exclusion of the factors may be justified in a country where universal health care system is in practice, such as Canada or UK.
References
Parthasarathy, S. 2005. Architectures of genetic medicine: Comparing genetic testing for breast cancer in the USA and the UK. Social Studies of Science 35(1):5-40.
Value-Free or Value-Laden Science
The idea of value-free refers to “social, ethical, and political values should have no influence over the reasoning of scientists, and that scientists should proceed in their work with a little concern as possible for such values” Douglas (2009, 1).
From the statement of value-free science above, what I understand is that reasoning of scientists should be free from any influences from society, ethics, and politics. Reasoning is defined as “the process of making inferences from a body of information” (Mohanan 2011). He further gives an example of Zeno. When we say that Zeno is a spider, then the reasoning is that Zeno has eight legs. How this reasoning is free from influence of society, ethical, and political values? There is a rule of reasoning, [(1) information (premises) à (2) reasoning à (3) inference (conclusion)] (Mohanan 2011). From the rule mentioned, I see that the reasoning is logical. Let me refer to Mohanan’s (2011) good and bad reasoning example as follows:
| Good reasoning | Bad reasoning |
| All humans are mammals. Mohanan is a human. Therefore Mohanan is a mammal. | All humans are mammals. Mohanan is a mammal. Therefore Mohanan is a human. |
The good reasoning follows the logical structure whereas the bad one does not appear as logical. Therefore, reasoning needs to be “logic”. Now what I would like to point out is that why “we” see this reasoning as “good” or “bad”. Is that our “values” assigned to the reasoning of the scientists? If a scientist has only information, “Mohanan is a mammal” and he reaches a conclusion of “Therefore Mohanan is a human”. What would our value judgment on the reasoning of the scientist? Bad reasoning! Therefore, I would say that science is not value-free.
Then, when it is not value-free, it must be loaded with values or value-laden, according to Lekkha-Kowalik (2010). Among the three aspects of value-ladenness, I would like to point out one aspect: connection between costs or funding sources and the science. A scientist seeking a funding from a tobacco company might be loaded with values from underlying wish of the tobacco company. The company may wish to see the there are no relationship between smoking and cancer. When the scientist accepts the money/funding, he may have agreed findings to support the desired relationship. Recently, I had attended a lecture of a speaker from Arizona Department of Health who claimed that there were many tobacco studies that were funded by the companies and their findings reveal no relationship between smoking and lung cancer.
Since there cannot be a value-free science, we see the science is value-laden. Douglas (2009) points out that value-free or value-neutral are impossible and they have limited implementation. Therefore, the best alternative would be searching for “unacceptable” values. Well, I would argue that “unacceptable” values are also value-laden. Whose unacceptability is that? Who is going to make decision on “unacceptable” values based on whose value judgments. The only answer I have is “I do not know”.
References
Douglas, H.E. 2009. Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, Pa.
Lekka-Kowalik, A. 2010. Why Science cannot be Value-Free Understanding the Rationality and Responsibility of Science. Science and Engineering Ethics 16(1):33-41.
Mohanan, K.P. What is Reasoning? 2011. 3-15-2011.
Forethought of a Technological Regime
In “Techne and Politeia” Langdon Winner writes, “To argue a moral position convincingly these days requires that one speak to… people’s love of material well-being, their fascination with efficiency, or their fear of death.” These seem reasonable and justifiably highly ranked among priorities one might consider as personal or social objectives. With regards to technology, Winner points out that there are other priorities and suggests we give, “…due consideration to what means or manner of life best serves our purpose”. Importantly he writes, “…each significant area of technical/functional organization in modern society can be seen as a kind of regime, a regime of instrumentality, under which we are obliged to live.” In general, Winner makes the point that capitalism has placed too much emphasis on efficiency at the expense of other values, and that this and other factors constitutes a structuralism which constrains our lives. So how did this develop?
Beginning roughly with the Enlightenment era and proceeding from feudalist to industrial society, perceptions of progress originated as being in the service of liberation from political oppression. Later as the Western mode of industrial development shifted towards latter forms of capitalism, the original conception of progress was transformed and supplanted by a highly technocratic view, which valued improvements in power, efficiency, and rationality as ends in themselves. But as capitalist society evolved over time, emphasis on efficiency grew to paramount importance while other values diminished.
As the character of society moved from agrarian to industrial, a new progressive ideology developed. Industrialists, because of their vested interest, redefined progress and technological development in terms of maximizing profits. The original enlightenment concept of progress as a liberating force turned to dissolution as technocracy became a socially oppressive force. With Fordism the protestant work ethic was gradually given up in exchange for a $5 per day wage. By the 20th century, the new technocratic view eventually became obsessed with, “...interest in economies of scale, standardization of process and product, and control of the workplace.” (Marx, 1987)
Winner cites Thomas Jefferson who noted, the development of industrial scale manufacturing would be, “…incompatible with the life of a stable, virtuous republic.” He argued that, “Manufacturing would create a thoroughly dependent rather than a self—sufficient populace.” And this “Dependence… begets subservience and venality” and “suffocates the germ of virtue”. Jefferson foresaw the coming of a proletarian class and the associated urban problems and thus rejected the idea of developing an American factory system. It could be said that Jefferson anticipated the viewpoint of the environmentalists. “…for whom the test of a technological innovation is its effect on the overall quality of life.” (Marx, 1987)
Jefferson, however, viewed progress as necessary a criteria for the achievement of political and social liberation and regarded the new sciences and technologies as instruments for carrying out a comprehensive transformation of society. about the time thinkers like Jefferson passed away, Thoreau warned about confusion between the relationship of ends and means and wrote of the new inventions as "improved means to unimproved ends". He referred to his countrymen as becoming "the tools of their tools."
Everyone knows, “it’s the economy stupid!”—or is it? If there is to be a shift in political emphasis from short-term economic well-being to something with a more socially desirable long-term outcome, then how do we find some new unified goal to get from here to there without being utopian? Winner writes, “All varieties of hardware and their corresponding forms of social life must be scrutinized to see whether they are friendly or unfriendly to the idea of a just society.” Nothing utopian here—right? It’s easy to criticize a technological regime, with hindsight, but with so many social constructionist and constructivist forces pushing and pulling these trajectories, how do we begin to predict or influence such developments?
Ref:
Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” in L. Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: The Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago Univ Press, 1986).
Leo Marx, “Does Improved Technology Mean Progress?” Technology Review 90, 1987.
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