Douglas and Political Science

As one who is studying political science, I am inclined to take Douglas’ argument over to social science and see if it would fit. The argument is made in the introduction on why only the natural sciences are focused on in the book. Social sciences are left out for two main reasons: (1) To decrease the complexity of an already complex problem and discourse (2) and, since many of their subjects are human beings, social science face reflexivity problems when the subjects can interact and transform as result of the research.  (Page 21)

I can understand the first justification. Just as Douglas stated in her book, values do have a direct role in deciding what to study. This choice to study values in natural sciences probably reflects her values in regards to this topic. Furthermore, complexity does need to be handled in some fashion when researching. I am less convinced by the second justification. This last justification was left hanging. It almost gave the appearance that this only occurs in the social science. Yes, many of the subjects in the natural sciences aren’t sentient in that they can communicate intelligently with the researcher and research itself. Yet, as we have covered many times in this and other courses, nature can be and is shaped by research both directly and indirectly—i.e. GMOs actually create a new type of organism while quark models changed our perception of matter and particles. Reflexivity problems exist throughout the sciences and are not a reason to not include the social sciences.

Subsequently, can Douglas’ model for science and policy work with political science and policy? In looking back, there are many useful insights to be taken and used.  Political Scientists have moral responsibilities in regards to errors in their work. Uncertainties occur in political science research just as much as it does in the natural sciences. Values of the researcher need to be constrained to their proper areas. Being explicit and acknowledging one’s values is important in all types of research.

However, Political Science examines humans and institutions: their actions, their beliefs, and their structure. These are not explicitly quantifiable. How a researcher decides to operationalize and quantify their measures requires value judgments. According to Douglas’ definition, such a decision would require the direct use of values—which goes against the advice of the book. Is this necessarily a bad thing? A necessary evil that comes with the positivist territory? Yes and no. If the direct value can be properly managed and understood, there can be a place for it in political science research.

This leads me to the next question: can the public democratize political science (social science in general) by being included in the process of making value judgment? If so, what type of input can they provide? In addition to the area’s Douglas mentioned (how to handle uncertainties and deciding when enough information is enough), the pubic can also help research operationalize their subject material and making sure this direct use of values is done in accordance to public values and related consequences to “false” operationalization is both understood and accepted.