Kevin Margeson
HSD 501 – Science and Democracy, Dr. Miller
Weekly Reading Brief 6 – Feb 25, 2011
Science and Representation
Do we elect representatives to express their will or the will of their constituents? In the practice of American democracy and the execution of our civic discourse I often hear people advocate mutually exclusive points of view on this, The new catch phrase “Elections have consequences.” has been bandied about by the right, who also vehemently oppose most of the positions espoused by the current administration. This is certainly not limited to the right, but it is an example of the sometimes contradictory view of how we want our representatives to express our desires. We have discussed how American government is based on the idea that an informed public will generally make the right decision given accurate information. (and after exhausting all other options, as Churchill pointed out.)
The representatives that make decisions on the behalf of the population often have to deal with technical issues filtered through the lens of the media, which informs the general public. The media has adopted much of the adversarial style of debate of our public forum giving equal time to opposing points of view. But I have to ask is this the best way of debating public issues. Do we need give equal time to minority opinions in scientific debates? Do we need to give credence to those who adopt positions so far out of the mainstream of scientific opinion that they border on the irrational? Would Galileo have passed that test? Or Newton? Or Curie? The public and official positions were against them as well and their viewpoints eventually made the forefront of scientific knowledge.
In today’s world of media coverage, the perception of policy related scientific issues like global warming, healthcare issues such as breast cancer screening, and even energy exploration all get media spin based on public outrage, corporate image making, and political party maneuvering.
This weekend I happened to be watching Gasland on HBO, a documentary on natural gas exploration and the devastation it has caused in rural areas and the potential dangers and impacts or fracture gas exploration. Not too long after that film, I was watching This Week from ABC News, which always has a big corporate image type of sponsor, and sure enough the American Petroleum Institute had several public information announcements wildly expressing the public benefit of the natural gas industry. So the public is receiving vastly varied opinions on most technical and scientific issues from credible sources with official sounding names. Officials will be receiving position advice from varying interest groups and constituents with passionate views informed by these divergent opinions. Who are they to believe? And should they disclose the source of that decision? I believe they should be required to cite specific sources to ensure disclosure, but those sources may be cloaked with media spin as much as their messages.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Friday, February 25, 2011
The de-politicization of science
ASU Biodesign Institute held a conference today titled “Dangerous Liaisons: Dual Use Research in the 20th Century” that addresses the role of regulation in research that can be utilized formally in a laboratory or can be taken out of the lab and used to incite harmful results. A common example of this is portrayed in biotechnology and the ability to recreate eradicated diseases and the powerful potential of this information and knowledge. In retrospect of today’s lecture by Dr. Miller, I was confronted with the idea of the de-politicization of science that was mentioned by Mark Brown in his book Science in Democracy. Here the author examines the claim that “science has been politicized implies it was previously not political. And assuming that politicization is reversible, things that have become political can be depoliticized as well.” If science has become politicized, is it possible to depoliticize it and if so than is the response to dual research serving as an example of this de-politicization?
There were four specialists that presented at the dual research conference and the person of interest to this discussion, in my opinion, was Edward H. You (FBI Supervisory Special Agent, Bioterrorism Program, Countermeasures Unit I). He was involved in the creation of a self-regulatory government system that allows researchers to provide information about suspect persons or actions regarding dual use research that may pose a risk to the general public. What was surprising about this move by the FBI is the severity of the situation regarding research information and the amount responsibility placed upon the shoulders of the science community, it allows them to self-regulate within their lab or the science community. This group emphasized government regulation without involvement. Instead of directly regulating science, the government chose to support researchers through assistance reflecting a situation where neither power nor conflict was involved, making it fall into Mark Brown’s category of non-politics. The government agency recognized the importance of the science community in informing policy and wanted to address the situation without restricting science, as is the case with increased regulations and obstacles to funding. They were aware of the negative impact this would have upon research initiatives. Furthermore, it seemed that there was an honest sense of collaboration between the government agency and researchers on this topic and a collaborative initiative to educate researchers on awareness of the dual use of their work. In addition to creating a situation of informed researchers, the agency recognized the need to create a space where the public could get involved in science research to encourage the progress of science. The approach that this particular government agency took to address issues of research that could very easily have demanded legislative restrictions demonstrates what may be a new era of learning to trust scientists to self regulate in the interest of the community and thus create a situation that may lead to the de-politicization of science.
Multifaceted Approaches to Participatory Governance
Science in Democracy was a fascinating read. It tells the familiar tale of the rise of scientific institutions through a thoroughly Western viewpoint, referencing all of the dominant names in the scientific revolution (and related political theorists). I enjoyed the section on Rousseau as On the Social Contract has been sitting on my shelf for years unread. I thought the concept of general will being an internal phenomenon was interesting. Rousseau contrasts the general will with opinions or interests which “may be easily shared” (77). He also points out that the general will is expressed by the people through a lack of debate in the public sphere. While I find this intriguing, I have to say there are numerous influences which impact what may or may not be discussed in the public sphere such as taboos (stemming from an ongoing redefinition of culture), as well as ignorance to a certain topic, among other things. He implies that the act of communication with others alone impacts our ideas about civic matters. While I certainly think it can intensify it, I would not argue that lack of vigorous discussion leaves one closed off to changing “general will”.
The question of the level of participatory governance has been a theme this week. At a seminar on Wednesday, Elisabeth Graffy of the USGS described the politics surrounding energy research within that institution. She mentioned the fact that there are many people working on bits and pieces of the energy puzzle, but nobody is thinking through it comprehensively (this echoes calls from a former seminar reference for a more integrated decision-making or knowledge-sharing process within public utilities between the engineers and the businesspeople). She said that a strategic plan must come from universities if any place because these institutions are somehow better suited to take a holistic approach than governmental agencies charged with specific tasks for which funding may not be available for this type of investigation. Discussed was the proper balance of public input and information. Too much public deliberation could cause fatigue, while not enough potentially causes backlash. Questions were raised as to the current best practices actually in place as opposed to what did not work. We did not find an example in the seminar, but I am sure they exist.
Brown calls for multifaceted approach stating, “Participation in the politics of science and technology should avoid becoming fixed on any particular institutional venue” (222). As we have discussed in class, public hearings oftentimes only allow “scientifically justifiable” evidence to be examined. This leaves out a host of other issues which could potentially radically alter peoples (and nonhuman actors’) existence. This sentiment was also captured in Graffy’s talk about the energy problem when she said that, “We say there are no silver bullets but we act as though there might be”. Pursuing many angles simultaneously (in nearly any problem solving strategy) is in my opinion advantageous, and I think Brown is right to suggest that there is a danger in funneling all citizen input into one place.
Brown suggests that “when scientists, engineers, doctors and other experts engage with laypeople’s demands, they become those people’s representatives” (259). This is an interesting statement. I would say that it is the responsibility of the expert once new perspectives come to light to carefully consider them. Not only during civic engagement activities, but prior to them as well (which I suppose goes without saying if these institutions deem it desirable to even begin a process like this.
Isn’t it nice when e-mails perfectly illustrate your point? This morning I saw this blurb in the GIOS Sustainability Digest:
“12th Annual Evidence-Based Practice Conference Call for Papers
(Thursday-Friday, June 9-10, 2011) Submit your abstract to the conference to be held in Phoenix. The theme is Using Evidence to Impact Policy and Practice. For more information and to submit abstracts go to http://nursingandhealth.asu.edu/evidence-based-practice/conference”
Apparently this is a training program for nurses at ASU, but the description was so filled with buzzwords, like “change”, and “innovation” that I couldn’t actually figure out what it meant and the link to the conference was broken. Overall, I found this book to be an interesting introduction (to me) of democratizing science.
The question of the level of participatory governance has been a theme this week. At a seminar on Wednesday, Elisabeth Graffy of the USGS described the politics surrounding energy research within that institution. She mentioned the fact that there are many people working on bits and pieces of the energy puzzle, but nobody is thinking through it comprehensively (this echoes calls from a former seminar reference for a more integrated decision-making or knowledge-sharing process within public utilities between the engineers and the businesspeople). She said that a strategic plan must come from universities if any place because these institutions are somehow better suited to take a holistic approach than governmental agencies charged with specific tasks for which funding may not be available for this type of investigation. Discussed was the proper balance of public input and information. Too much public deliberation could cause fatigue, while not enough potentially causes backlash. Questions were raised as to the current best practices actually in place as opposed to what did not work. We did not find an example in the seminar, but I am sure they exist.
Brown calls for multifaceted approach stating, “Participation in the politics of science and technology should avoid becoming fixed on any particular institutional venue” (222). As we have discussed in class, public hearings oftentimes only allow “scientifically justifiable” evidence to be examined. This leaves out a host of other issues which could potentially radically alter peoples (and nonhuman actors’) existence. This sentiment was also captured in Graffy’s talk about the energy problem when she said that, “We say there are no silver bullets but we act as though there might be”. Pursuing many angles simultaneously (in nearly any problem solving strategy) is in my opinion advantageous, and I think Brown is right to suggest that there is a danger in funneling all citizen input into one place.
Brown suggests that “when scientists, engineers, doctors and other experts engage with laypeople’s demands, they become those people’s representatives” (259). This is an interesting statement. I would say that it is the responsibility of the expert once new perspectives come to light to carefully consider them. Not only during civic engagement activities, but prior to them as well (which I suppose goes without saying if these institutions deem it desirable to even begin a process like this.
Isn’t it nice when e-mails perfectly illustrate your point? This morning I saw this blurb in the GIOS Sustainability Digest:
“12th Annual Evidence-Based Practice Conference Call for Papers
(Thursday-Friday, June 9-10, 2011) Submit your abstract to the conference to be held in Phoenix. The theme is Using Evidence to Impact Policy and Practice. For more information and to submit abstracts go to http://nursingandhealth.asu.edu/evidence-based-practice/conference”
Apparently this is a training program for nurses at ASU, but the description was so filled with buzzwords, like “change”, and “innovation” that I couldn’t actually figure out what it meant and the link to the conference was broken. Overall, I found this book to be an interesting introduction (to me) of democratizing science.
Tempest in a Teaparty: A Machiavellian tale
In Science in Democracy, Mark Brown walks us through an interpretive garden of ideas. There are plaques commemorating Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Dewey, among others. Under each plaque is a story about Science in Democracy, written by the author and quoting other ideas from the likes of Bruno Latour. These stories fold out like a diorama to illustrate a guided history of the evolution of Science in Democracy. The first stop along this journey could very well be re-titled: “Sympathy for the devil: how Machiavelli is just misunderstood.”
While it is true that Niccolo Machiavelli wrote some things that might seem misogynistic or despotic to our 21st century sensibilities, it would be a mistake to throw the baby out with the bathwater, according to Brown and others. Brown goes on to give an interpretaton of Machiavelli’s works that puts a new spin on the infamous author of The Prince and Discourses on Livy. What seems at first a course interpretation of a prince’s duties and expectations come to life as a commentary on the role of Science and Technology.
Brown says of Machiavelli’s rhetorical stance, “…everyone assumes political actors have power but lack knowledge.” This statement helps place Machiavelli both on the metaphorical plains looking up at the mountain and upon the mountain looking down upon the plains, both knowing the prince and the common people alike. His epistemological arguments are bold, but there are two things that drew my interest.
First, Brown introduces the concept of reflexivity in governance through Machiavelli. The prince’s “…success rested not merely on what they did but on how they adjusted their actions to their circumstances. A prince should not copy historical exemplars but use them as resources for innovative thought and action.” I count this as an eloquent expression of reflexivity. The idea here is that there are always going to be “wicked problems” and there will probably never be singular silver–bullet solutions to fix them. Thus, a constant state of flexibility in mind and approach to science is necessary. The elicitation of expert scientific advice is an iterative process that never ends.
Second, Brown says this, “Popular participation, for Machiavelli, is not about pursuing the good life but about protecting oneself and one’s fellow citizens from domination. Doing so requires not merely civic virtue but institutions that facilitate public contestation of elite decisions.” He goes on to say, “Political elites will always try to usurp the liberty of the people, but the threat can be mitigated through formal institutions that give the citizenry real power.” This seems to me a desire of those in the current movement calling itself the tea party. It would appear that they desire a Voice and that they fear elites telling them what to do. This is different from the idea that there is a group of trusted scientific advisors who help the prince look out for the well-being of the people. In this world-view, those scientists are the enemy of the people, in so far as they seek to establish power and influence for themselves.
So, what Machiavelli and in turn Brown appear to be saying here, is very fundamental. They would look to have a reflexive, iterative, institutionalized process whereby the common people can have input into the science-policy dialog. Again, I believe this sentiment would fit well with the beliefs of those in the Tea party, whether or not they would frame it in such terms.
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Democrats, Experts, and STS
Governing is no easy task. While in some idealized, Athenian past, every decision required of the body politic might have drawn solely on common sense, these days every decision is intertwined with knowledge known only to specialists in the relevant field; it is locked behind walls of expertise. The body politic, if it is not to flail randomly in an insensate throes, must rely on the advice of experts. How then can rule by a small elite be reconciled with democracy?
The modern expert advisor is the spiritual descendant of Machiavelli. The brutally realist Italian revolutionized the Mirror for Princes genre, speaking directly in the vernacular, and cloaking his rhetoric in an objective "view from nowhere." To prove his credibility, Machiavelli erased himself, claiming merely to transmit the facts of history and psychology into applicable lessons on power. Early scientists, as exemplified by the British Royal Society of Boyle's era, used the same technique to 'merely transmit the facts of nature,' displaying for the public that which was self-evidently true.
The Machiavellian advisor works primarily at the point of power, at the person of the sovereign, but in a modern democracy, the sovereign is a fiction. The people rule, through their representatives. Though the relation of the people and their representatives is far from straightforward, (representatives speak for the people, make decisions for the people, and serve as targets of blame for the people, among their diverse function), a representative who strays too far from the desires of his or her constituents will soon fall. Therefore, expert advice applied at this level, once it departs from common knowledge, becomes useless. The experts and those who listen to them will be discarded at the first opportunity.
Instead, in a democracy, experts must also address the validity of their claims to the public. The end product of advice, and the advisory process itself, must appear credible. Science (roughly, the process of discovering facts about the natural world) in it's Enlightenment legacy, and the scientifically derived technologies around us, is one means of certifying the validity of expert claims, and representative decisions. Yet, because scientific claims speak to fundamental truths about the world, and can thereby override deliberation, astute politicians have learned to deploy counter-claims and counter-experts. Moreover, political figures has disseminated a narrative that discredits the ability of science to make any epistemically true and relevant claims about the world.
How then can scientists operate in a climate of such hostility? Dewey provides an model; by visualizing society as composed of a network of identities, with individuals belonging to multiple identities at once, he suggests that science can be democratized by tying as many people as possible to the "scientist" network. But what exactly is it that individuals should be educated in? There is no way for people to learn more than a scanty sampling of science. Rather, the chief science, the skill of kings, is learning to evaluate experts and their claims. There are universal patterns to how expert knowledge is created, and the vitamin that the body politic needs today is not more public scientific knowledge, but more public science, technology, and society scholarship.
The modern expert advisor is the spiritual descendant of Machiavelli. The brutally realist Italian revolutionized the Mirror for Princes genre, speaking directly in the vernacular, and cloaking his rhetoric in an objective "view from nowhere." To prove his credibility, Machiavelli erased himself, claiming merely to transmit the facts of history and psychology into applicable lessons on power. Early scientists, as exemplified by the British Royal Society of Boyle's era, used the same technique to 'merely transmit the facts of nature,' displaying for the public that which was self-evidently true.
The Machiavellian advisor works primarily at the point of power, at the person of the sovereign, but in a modern democracy, the sovereign is a fiction. The people rule, through their representatives. Though the relation of the people and their representatives is far from straightforward, (representatives speak for the people, make decisions for the people, and serve as targets of blame for the people, among their diverse function), a representative who strays too far from the desires of his or her constituents will soon fall. Therefore, expert advice applied at this level, once it departs from common knowledge, becomes useless. The experts and those who listen to them will be discarded at the first opportunity.
Instead, in a democracy, experts must also address the validity of their claims to the public. The end product of advice, and the advisory process itself, must appear credible. Science (roughly, the process of discovering facts about the natural world) in it's Enlightenment legacy, and the scientifically derived technologies around us, is one means of certifying the validity of expert claims, and representative decisions. Yet, because scientific claims speak to fundamental truths about the world, and can thereby override deliberation, astute politicians have learned to deploy counter-claims and counter-experts. Moreover, political figures has disseminated a narrative that discredits the ability of science to make any epistemically true and relevant claims about the world.
How then can scientists operate in a climate of such hostility? Dewey provides an model; by visualizing society as composed of a network of identities, with individuals belonging to multiple identities at once, he suggests that science can be democratized by tying as many people as possible to the "scientist" network. But what exactly is it that individuals should be educated in? There is no way for people to learn more than a scanty sampling of science. Rather, the chief science, the skill of kings, is learning to evaluate experts and their claims. There are universal patterns to how expert knowledge is created, and the vitamin that the body politic needs today is not more public scientific knowledge, but more public science, technology, and society scholarship.
The symbiotic relationship between science and liberty in democracy
I had a chance to listen to a talk delivered by Timothy Ferris, Former Editor of Rolling Stone and Professor Emeritus at U.C. Berkeley on How Science Inspired Democracy in the Modern World at Coommonwealth Club on March 8, 2010 (Ferris, 2010). His main argument is that the symbiotic relationship between sicence and liberty in democracy must be recognized. He refers to liberalism which was originated and enshrined in the English Bill of Rights 1689 and US Bill of Rights 1789. “Liberalism is based on the hypothesis that people ought to be maximally free, with the government intervening only to the extent required to protect their freedoms against abridgment by their compatriots or by enemies abroad (Ferris, 2011). His multi-dimensional views of liberalism, totalitarian, progressive, and conservative are useful (Figure 1). He said that science is anti-authoritarian. “Science, like liberalism, has no fundamental connection to the Right or the Left and liberalism is equally accessible to conservatives and progressives alike (Ferris, 2011).”
Figure 1. Two-dimensional diamond view of political dynamics
Source: (Ferris, 2011)
In this week, I read the book, Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation by Mark B. Brown (2009). He intentionally selected the elements that constitute representation in his book. The five elements are namely (1) authorization, (2) accountability, (3) participation, (4) deliberation, and (5) resemblance. His main argument of the entire book is that he proposes a perspective of representativeness in democracy which avoids dichotomy between science and politics. Science is politicized because it is related to conflict and power. To solve the problem, he suggests that the politicized science should be democratized. In this country, who politicize the science? I think, there are two camps—progressives and conservatives. However, both of them have equal access to liberalism. “The opposite of conservatism, which cherishes practices that experience has shown to work in the past, is progressivism, which looks to the future (Figure 1) (Ferris, 2011).” When the science is politicized by the two camps, it is possible that they may place different values to the science which are competing each other. Science has the power to prove with facts but it does not have the power to make value judgments. When there is no politicized science, then there is no need for representation. “For representation is not needed where we expect scientifically true answers, where no value commitments, no decisions, no judgment are involved (Brown, 2009, p. 257).”
In short, it is clear to me that there is a relation between science and liberalism. Science is anti-authoritative. Whenever we do not place value or politicize the science, there will be less requirement for representation.
Reference
Brown, M. B. (2009). Science in democracy: expertise, institutions, and representation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Ferris, T. How Science Inspired Democracy in the Modern World. 2010. New York, The Commonwealth Club. 2-24-2011.
Ferris, Timothy (2011). Conservative Is Not Opposite Liberal: That's Totalitarianism. The Huffington Post.
Bridging the Divide
Overall, I have to say I liked the general premise of Brown’s book as I understood it: to ‘bring science into representative democracy’ and, although he admits it’s only partially achieved by his framework, reconcile the historically elitist practice of science with the non-elitism of democracy. He finds that the pseudo-elitism of representative government can serve as a go-between with these two worlds, and I believe that he fairly effectively argues his point.
Brown hopes to achieve with his framework a sort of scientific balance of interests somewhat akin to the balance of political interests achieved through representative government. To fulfill this, he seeks to make those interests transparent and adopt a deliberative atmosphere where a consensus or at least a broader understanding between the diverse represented interests can be achieved. On paper. this looks to be a great idea; in practice, I’m not sure that this can be reliably duplicated among the many government science advisory panels. As Brown indicates, power dynamics are still present when these panels meet to trade ideas and form policy recommendations. In any human endeavor that exhibits power dynamics, there is the danger of one interest gaining disproportionate power over the others and subverting the rules that all the participants are obliged to operate by. I’m not sure that Brown adequately proved (at least to me) that his framework can keep these power dynamics in check and prevent an interest that is determined to undermine the process from doing so.
In particular, Brown’s argument for a deliberative atmosphere may be hard to put into practice. When these panels are more directly politicized, their power dynamics begin to more directly take on the character of the general political atmosphere; when there is an agreeable zeitgeist, the proceedings are likely to be smooth and closer to what Brown imagines. However, when the tone of the political debate is more contentious, this general feeling can leak into the proceedings of the panel and disrupt the deliberative atmosphere. Brown’s inclusion of the representative concept may dampen this a little, but, as we see with our current representatives, it may be just as likely to lead to gridlock as anything else.
With that said, this is a very difficult problem, and I think Brown makes a good attempt at conceptually bridging the divide. Testing his ideas by designing science advisory panels according to his framework would allow us to see what they look like in practice, and would allow us to make the corrections that would get us closer to achieving the vision of a science complex that incorporates more democratic, and deliberative, elements.
Brown hopes to achieve with his framework a sort of scientific balance of interests somewhat akin to the balance of political interests achieved through representative government. To fulfill this, he seeks to make those interests transparent and adopt a deliberative atmosphere where a consensus or at least a broader understanding between the diverse represented interests can be achieved. On paper. this looks to be a great idea; in practice, I’m not sure that this can be reliably duplicated among the many government science advisory panels. As Brown indicates, power dynamics are still present when these panels meet to trade ideas and form policy recommendations. In any human endeavor that exhibits power dynamics, there is the danger of one interest gaining disproportionate power over the others and subverting the rules that all the participants are obliged to operate by. I’m not sure that Brown adequately proved (at least to me) that his framework can keep these power dynamics in check and prevent an interest that is determined to undermine the process from doing so.
In particular, Brown’s argument for a deliberative atmosphere may be hard to put into practice. When these panels are more directly politicized, their power dynamics begin to more directly take on the character of the general political atmosphere; when there is an agreeable zeitgeist, the proceedings are likely to be smooth and closer to what Brown imagines. However, when the tone of the political debate is more contentious, this general feeling can leak into the proceedings of the panel and disrupt the deliberative atmosphere. Brown’s inclusion of the representative concept may dampen this a little, but, as we see with our current representatives, it may be just as likely to lead to gridlock as anything else.
With that said, this is a very difficult problem, and I think Brown makes a good attempt at conceptually bridging the divide. Testing his ideas by designing science advisory panels according to his framework would allow us to see what they look like in practice, and would allow us to make the corrections that would get us closer to achieving the vision of a science complex that incorporates more democratic, and deliberative, elements.
To be Politicized, Or Not to Be. That is the Question
As I am presenting this week, I thought it would be useful to use this blog post to discuss politicized science as defined by Mark Brown as I have some issues with part of it.
To being with, there are three necessary and sufficient criteria that make science politicized: power, conflict (over values and interests), and public. Little emphasis is placed this last criteria, but it seems that without the public, there would be need to worry about politicized science. Brown does state how this definition is misleading as it assumes that science can be politics free. Even research that meticulously follows the scientific method has politics in it, even if just the hierarchy of the lab and lab funding.
Brown places a lot of emphasis on the first criteria: power. It is easy for science to become political as most sociotechnical issues revolve around power. Brown thought it would be useful to look at what is it not. Science won’t be political when there is:
Foucault would say such a description is impossible if not erroneous. For Foucault, everything has power intertwined in it.
Taking this, in science advisory boards, when conflict of opinion is solved amicably through open and fair discussion, it is not political. From here, one way to prevent politicized in general is to equalize of power via collegial harmony and public acceptance. This seems almost an Utopian view of science and politics. I might be wrong, but even with a consensus is built, power and conflict are still in existence.
Brown also asks if this politicized definition implies this process is reversible? Now, Brown never comes back to address if it is reversible and how this could be done. What the author does leave us is his ultimate goal for this book: not to eliminate politics of expertise but to embed it. In essence, it might be reversible, but Brown doesn’t want to do that.
I think one major issue Brown seems to have is that he jumps around in the book from individual power to state level power. At time he focuses on national power and forgets about individual power. Other times, he focuses too much on individual power.
To being with, there are three necessary and sufficient criteria that make science politicized: power, conflict (over values and interests), and public. Little emphasis is placed this last criteria, but it seems that without the public, there would be need to worry about politicized science. Brown does state how this definition is misleading as it assumes that science can be politics free. Even research that meticulously follows the scientific method has politics in it, even if just the hierarchy of the lab and lab funding.
Brown places a lot of emphasis on the first criteria: power. It is easy for science to become political as most sociotechnical issues revolve around power. Brown thought it would be useful to look at what is it not. Science won’t be political when there is:
- No conflict and no power: ie. Everyday/ordinary life
- Conflict but no power: ie. When a conflict is resolved trough open discussion and/or consensus.
- Power but no conflict: ie. Things that are latently political; conflict is suppressed
Foucault would say such a description is impossible if not erroneous. For Foucault, everything has power intertwined in it.
Taking this, in science advisory boards, when conflict of opinion is solved amicably through open and fair discussion, it is not political. From here, one way to prevent politicized in general is to equalize of power via collegial harmony and public acceptance. This seems almost an Utopian view of science and politics. I might be wrong, but even with a consensus is built, power and conflict are still in existence.
Brown also asks if this politicized definition implies this process is reversible? Now, Brown never comes back to address if it is reversible and how this could be done. What the author does leave us is his ultimate goal for this book: not to eliminate politics of expertise but to embed it. In essence, it might be reversible, but Brown doesn’t want to do that.
I think one major issue Brown seems to have is that he jumps around in the book from individual power to state level power. At time he focuses on national power and forgets about individual power. Other times, he focuses too much on individual power.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
"Global" Civic Epistemology
How do we know what we know, and how is that knowledge translated into power? By what means do we acquire sufficient and adequate certainty for making important decisions of global importance? Epistemology is more than knowing how to know, it entails a practical, theoretical, and philosophic inquiry into the nature and basis from which knowledge is established. Importantly, it is also an investigation of validity and the limits of knowledge, which also includes knowing what we don’t know—that is, knowing what is overlooked.
Knowledge, of course, is power. What we think we know, that which has been established as norms and values, form the basis for decision making. This ‘common’ knowledge shapes and controls the way issues are talked about and in so doing forms a ‘regime’ of control which can heavily influence outcomes. Thus, such regimes of control form foundations of political power.
“Civic” epistemology implies a social process that varies with context and scale from the local to the national level and importantly, it is and has been developing at the global level—beyond the bounds of national sovereignty. Civic epistemology, being a public and collective action, involves scientific and political communities who construct, review, validate, and deliberate, to produce knowledge to be translated into action, thus constituting the epistemic foundations of public life (Miller, 2008). Sociologist and political scientists are well familiar with this process within the domestic confines of government, but what about global governance?
In his 2008 paper “Civic Epistemologies”, Clark Miller outlines the major factors which tie together the pluralistic nature of decision making as a conflictive process characterized by many social actors having different ideas and values, each being motivated by self-interests. “Norms and values are determined largely by cultural context within established traditions which vary widely across geographic boundaries.” “Knowledge is tied to aspects of political life; identity, authority, legitimacy, and accountability.” (Miller, 2008)
He continues, "As the globalization of policy problems increasingly blurs the boundary between domestic and international politics, questions about knowledge and democracy will blur as well.” Importantly, “International knowledge institutions will increasingly gain relevance, even in domestic policy decisions, as we are currently seeing in relation to energy policy and climate change.” Yet, this transition will likely increase conflict over the epistemic standards of international institutions.
Miller further ties the factors of legitimation and accountability to the works of Yaron Ezrahi. In Ezrahi’s 1990 book “The Descent of Icarus”, he emphasizes the centrality of science in the theory and practice of modern liberal-democratic action. He examines the role of science and technology in political strategies of defining and legitimating actions as well as holding actors accountable in the context of public affairs. He diligently supports the claim that the practical nature of scientific inquiry is central to the theory and practice of modern liberal-democratic action, which rely on the principles and mechanisms of instrumentalism, objectivity, legitimation and accountability.
The liberal-democratic tradition is associated with an open society, freedoms of speech and association, tolerance, and the decentralization of political power. These principles are upheld by a political epistemology that is based upon scientific and technical standards of action which function as a means of accountability and are, as he writes, “…a principal factor incorporated into liberal-democratic rituals of legitimation” “…a crucially important move towards the public constitution and validation of knowledge” (Ezrahi, 1990).
Ezrahi not only asserts the validity of scientific instrumentalism as the fundamental framework for modern liberal-democratic polity, but he also claims that it is in decline. If it is to be believed that there is a decline in the faith of scientific knowledge then this threatens to undermine, as the author claims, the conditions necessary for maintaining freedom and order and constitutes an attack on the source of validity of knowledge, this also being an attack on any claims of a special authority to act in the ways we are accustom. He claims, “Skepticism towards an instrumental scientific conception of public actions, previously limited to counter-enlightenment circles, has now become nearly universal.” There has been a, “…decline in the cultural force of science” and “…of beliefs in the existence of objective external reality and the possibility of universally valid scientific knowledge has led to a decline in a whole range of political constructions.” (Ezrahi, 1990)
Weather we are experiencing “counter-Enlightenment” as Ezrahi suggest is open to some debate and is beyond the scope of this short blog. However, still relevant today, as in the seventeenth century, remain the challenges of what Robert Boyle described as the, “…vulnerability of the uneducated to the corruptive effects of evocative spectacles and the tricks of demagogues.” Short of open rational public discourse we can expect increasing centralization of political power and decision making on a global scale. But with the increase of many voices competing and contributing to public knowledge, perhaps there is some remedy to those who would fall vulnerable to such demagogues. As the French philosopher Condorcet wrote, ’The more men are enlightened, the less those with authority can abuse it and the less necessary it will be to give people of authority social powers, energy and extent. Thus truth is the enemy of power, as of those who exercise it. The more it spreads, the less they will be able to mislead men the more force it acquires the less societies need to be governed.”
Ref:
Ezrahi, Y (1990), The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), Chapters 1-3.
Miller, C (2008), Civic Epistemologies: Constituting Knowledge and Order in Political Communities,” Sociology Compass 2(6): 1896-1919.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Can Global Health Respond to Cultures
While reading about the Sellafield-Windscale sheep farmers in Brian Wynne’s “Misunderstood Misunderstandings” the connection was established between scientific knowledge and tacit knowledge along with the conflict between them that can shape how science intervenes in society. The author’s use of the sheep farmer’s tacit knowledge of the land and the scientists who were unable to be reflexive enough to incorporate that knowledge into their analysis of the ecological behavior demonstrates the “incompatible social and cultural structures” that created the dissidence. Throughout the reading I could not help but wonder what sort of knowledge relationships will emerge in global health and whether or not it will be reflexive enough to incorporate the tacit knowledge of indigenous cultures to which it is applied.
From my perspective, historically in the United States medicine has played an intermediary role between scientific knowledge generation through research and acceptance of new scientific information by the public through knowledge claims. The physician integrates the scientific perspective into something that is capable of dissolving in society and facilitating change. This builds credibility and trust by the community for the physician and offers reflexivity of the personal knowledge of patients for their own health back into their care. However, when speaking of a larger global community perspective and scientific knowledge is being applied to large populations with varying cultures, some with very few physicians to incorporate the much needed reflexivity, there exists a tension similar to the sheep farmers and scientists in Wynne’s article. Different cultures base their identity upon specific characteristics or tacit knowledge that makes them experts in their own environment; whether it is in sheep farming, any farming, pearl diving, factory work or any artifact that communities identify with as individuals. Scientific knowledge has the potential to impose upon the tacit knowledge of the local culture, thus threatening their identity. When a health crisis emerges, protocols established by scientists in the best interest of the society are implemented and it is these steps to provide safety that may fail to recognize the unique cultural needs and information that should be incorporated in the protocol and decision making process.
Furthermore, if scientific knowledge were to overstep bounds there is a regulatory framework established in the United States to allow for deliberation that may alter the function of a particular science and technology. When looking at a global arena, there is global anarchy and with no central governing body there is very little deliberation that allows for input into decision-making regarding global health concerns. While it is true that the World Health Organization incorporates many nations into their system of global health, there can be very little representation of smaller nation states within the larger political network. Furthermore, nations are often required to react to health situations in a manner that reflects a western notion of public health and fails to recognize or legitimate the unique cultural approaches to healthcare that is directly linked to a cultures identity, such as Aryurvedic medicine in India. There can also be very little consideration of the infrastructure of healthcare within certain nations that has recently contributed to a high rate of antibiotic resistant strains of bacteria due to lack of access to full rounds of antibiotics. This lack of access left cultures with partially treated illnesses and created a new situation of resistant bacteria that will be even more difficult to treat, if they can be treated at all. If the global health arena is to enhance public legitimation, knowledge and credibility it may need to incorporate a method for reflexivity that allows for various methods of organizing institutional reforms to accommodate different cultural identities in their solutions.
Democracy Breathes
In Clark Miller’s 2008 “Civic Epistemologies: Consulting Knowledge and Oder in Political Communities”, he spins a fine web of connections to explain the topic of Civil Epistemologies. To untangle the skein and help me understand the concepts in a good conceptual way, I decided to diagram some of the concepts that he explains and create a few metaphors. The most important one has to do with the way that Democracy handles deliberation. But first some of the supporting framework.
The concept of Knowledge-Orders is in constructed in three stages:
1.) Knowledge as complex judgments.
2.) Complex Judgments as Dynamic Social Processes.
3.) Knowledge & Social Processes coproduced, resulting in the yin/yang of Epistemic Frameworks vs Social & Political arrangements.
Further, the Epistemic swims with the Social in a co-production dance that itself has three layers: A.) Processes for producing Knowledge claims. B.) Knowledge conflict & contestation. C.)_ Collective processes.
Looking at #2 again, we see Complex Judgments as Dynamic social processes where competing knowledge claims are:
• Articulated
• Deliberated
• Negotiated
• Discarded
• Valorized (this is where emergence takes place)
So, what’s going on might be defined as “Deliberation”. This is where the back and forth goes on in Democracy and also where my metaphor comes in. Miller explains the process itself as being “stable over short periods of time” but with room for divergence and later reintegration. I say “Democracy breathes”. Imagine the democratic process taking a deep breath, inhaling divergent ideas and different ways of viewing the world. As the state’s lungs reach capacity, filled with chaos, a threshold is reached and reintegration begins. The capillaries start to distribute oxygen into the whole system in the form of ideas and the lungs begin to relax as reintegration occurs.
One example of how this process itself is heterogeneous is the difference between the United States and Europe. The US has a low threshold for democratic participation- virtually anyone can join in. The lungs of democracy expand wide in a deep breath, taking in many divergent points of view. But this takes time and the exhale of reintegration is long in coming. Conversely, Europe has a fairly high bar for participation, a more narrow set of ideas are considered, so the process ends more quickly. Their cycle of democratic breath is more staccato and quick, albeit shallow in comparison to the US model.
Either way, the process of divergence and reintegration might be violent or peaceful. Miller goes on to explain how this may happen from changes in the Epistemic, the Social, or both. Pluralist Democracies have lots of diverse views to be considered, but usually things go peacefully. That’s the difference between a stable, heterogeneous, Democratic transition of power and violent coupes or other less optimal changes in regime.
Although it was dramatic, Bush v. Gore might be compared to the current chaos in the Middle East in what may be termed Despot v. Populace. The former was peaceful in the end, even if the nation hung in a state of uncertainty for weeks before the Democratic exhale was complete. At that point of re-integration, Bush emerged as victor, but the true winners were the US citizens, despite their particular preference for a specific candidate. Again, as flawed as the process was, it happened with no bloodshed and healthy democratic process continued to thrive.
Minnesota, the Re-count Happy State.
Minnesota was witness to two major recounts in the past 3 years. The first being the Senate race between Republican incumbent Norm Coleman, and Democratic contender Al Franken in 2008, the second being the gubernatorial race between R Tom Emmer and former US senator D Mark Dayton in 2010. The earlier recount drew on for over eight months, while the latter was resolved a little over one month.
Both recounts were triggered automatically on account of the margins of victory. The Franken-Coleman race with Franken trailing by 215 votes, and the gubernatorial race with Dayton ahead by 9,000 votes. According to Voter Action an updated law came out prior to the Senate race:
[in 2008] The law expands on provisions of Minnesota’s recount law which provides for recounts in races within a margin of victory of 0.5%. Under the new added provision, candidates in any contest with a 5% margin of victory may call for a hand recount, at their expense, of up to three precincts. If the requested recount shows a difference greater than 0.5% compared to the Election Day results, there will be hand recounting of additional precincts. That could lead to a contest-wide recount if more disparities between the reported results and the hand counts are discovered.
Both recounts involved campaigns contesting votes, searching for discredited votes and more. The link below showcases some of the ridiculous (on account of both the voters as well as the candidates) votes called into question deemed “frivolous” when voter intent is clear during the Dayton/Emmer recount. Go ahead, read it, you may get a laugh or two.
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/12/01/photos-challenged-ballots/
The Franken/Coleman race involved numerous legal volleys and climbing through the appellate and ultimately led the contest to the Supreme Court. No doubt the 60 vote majority in the Senate was a driver for Coleman’s delay of the certification of the election results. When the results of the race were confirmed, the Coleman camp argued that the recount process was uneven from precinct to precinct. This points to how framing can shift from moment to moment within such contestations based on new developments. Before, it was a battle (for Coleman) to recount less precincts because he was ahead. When the tides changed in favor of Franken, the rhetoric of de-legitimizing the process became the major framework the Coleman group worked under.
Because the process was so drawn out, media coverage of it waned into the back pages of the newspaper as the months wore on, much like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe Miller is right to point to the importance of the media role as a huge actor in disseminating competing information about “correct” outcomes. (and I agree with the other poster about the legitimacy of collective info generated through media is questionable, though remember that most people only watch the morning and evening news, oftentimes only the local news. Additionally, we in America have a huge amount of “alternative media” compared to other countries).
Perhaps such circulation in the media as the above slideshow in addition to recount fatigue contributed to the speedier resolution of the latter recount. The practice round also probably streamlined the process by figuring out what worked and what didn’t. In any case, these examples illustrate the infrastructures in place which influence and drive the recount process. I was gearing up for another long and drawn out recount, but luckily did not have to wait too long for the second result (being that the person ahead was on “my side” however restricted this side may be). These examples also prove that Minnesota’s recount laws work, while showcasing how contested races can act as power plays in the broader political arena as in the Coleman case. Franken lost half of his term to the court system and Minnesota lost a voice in the senate for that time.
As an aside, I worked for the primary presidential election in Seattle at one of those electronic voting machines and was extremely hesitant to complete my post in that position. Until I learned about the machine. There were not one, but two paper trails, one contained within the machine, and the other rolled into a canister. The voter could see their choice on the paper through a window. This was not an electronic counter, but an actual voting machine for the disabled. Knowing there was in fact a paper trail left me more at ease with the position, and only a handful of folks utilized the resource. I know my reluctance to operate this machine had to do with the 2000 election although the technology was totally different, illustrating the pervasiveness of social memory across shifting contexts.
Both recounts were triggered automatically on account of the margins of victory. The Franken-Coleman race with Franken trailing by 215 votes, and the gubernatorial race with Dayton ahead by 9,000 votes. According to Voter Action an updated law came out prior to the Senate race:
[in 2008] The law expands on provisions of Minnesota’s recount law which provides for recounts in races within a margin of victory of 0.5%. Under the new added provision, candidates in any contest with a 5% margin of victory may call for a hand recount, at their expense, of up to three precincts. If the requested recount shows a difference greater than 0.5% compared to the Election Day results, there will be hand recounting of additional precincts. That could lead to a contest-wide recount if more disparities between the reported results and the hand counts are discovered.
Both recounts involved campaigns contesting votes, searching for discredited votes and more. The link below showcases some of the ridiculous (on account of both the voters as well as the candidates) votes called into question deemed “frivolous” when voter intent is clear during the Dayton/Emmer recount. Go ahead, read it, you may get a laugh or two.
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/12/01/photos-challenged-ballots/
The Franken/Coleman race involved numerous legal volleys and climbing through the appellate and ultimately led the contest to the Supreme Court. No doubt the 60 vote majority in the Senate was a driver for Coleman’s delay of the certification of the election results. When the results of the race were confirmed, the Coleman camp argued that the recount process was uneven from precinct to precinct. This points to how framing can shift from moment to moment within such contestations based on new developments. Before, it was a battle (for Coleman) to recount less precincts because he was ahead. When the tides changed in favor of Franken, the rhetoric of de-legitimizing the process became the major framework the Coleman group worked under.
Because the process was so drawn out, media coverage of it waned into the back pages of the newspaper as the months wore on, much like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe Miller is right to point to the importance of the media role as a huge actor in disseminating competing information about “correct” outcomes. (and I agree with the other poster about the legitimacy of collective info generated through media is questionable, though remember that most people only watch the morning and evening news, oftentimes only the local news. Additionally, we in America have a huge amount of “alternative media” compared to other countries).
Perhaps such circulation in the media as the above slideshow in addition to recount fatigue contributed to the speedier resolution of the latter recount. The practice round also probably streamlined the process by figuring out what worked and what didn’t. In any case, these examples illustrate the infrastructures in place which influence and drive the recount process. I was gearing up for another long and drawn out recount, but luckily did not have to wait too long for the second result (being that the person ahead was on “my side” however restricted this side may be). These examples also prove that Minnesota’s recount laws work, while showcasing how contested races can act as power plays in the broader political arena as in the Coleman case. Franken lost half of his term to the court system and Minnesota lost a voice in the senate for that time.
As an aside, I worked for the primary presidential election in Seattle at one of those electronic voting machines and was extremely hesitant to complete my post in that position. Until I learned about the machine. There were not one, but two paper trails, one contained within the machine, and the other rolled into a canister. The voter could see their choice on the paper through a window. This was not an electronic counter, but an actual voting machine for the disabled. Knowing there was in fact a paper trail left me more at ease with the position, and only a handful of folks utilized the resource. I know my reluctance to operate this machine had to do with the 2000 election although the technology was totally different, illustrating the pervasiveness of social memory across shifting contexts.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Non-rational knowledge creation
The readings this week concerning the creation of knowledge in political arenas and the give and take associated with that usually democratic process of creation helped inform my understanding of my own major subject and made me begin thinking about how this knowledge creation process commonly plays out from day to day. The articles predominately focused on scientific knowledge creation, and left relatively untouched the non-scientific methods of knowledge creation that are being used today.
Somewhat different to Wynne’s English sheep farmer example, in that their knowledge was seemingly developed through a rational but non-scientific process of historical trial and error, American political discourse has developed and refined the capacity to generate and deliver seemingly non-rational (or at least non-logical) knowledge narratives (think conspiracy theories). Instead of simply criticizing the mainstream consensus in an attempt to show internal flaws or lack of evidence, these new knowledge narratives present claims as a whole creation, providing an alternative to the knowledge narrative that they are meant to rebut. Although this type of knowledge creation has existed for most of history, it has become much more standardized in American political discourse recently, and may present an interesting problem to explore through the epistemological lens that was discussed specifically in Miller’s articles.
How would one begin analyzing this type of knowledge creation? An examination of the story, internal logic, and the ways that it draws on prior accepted knowledge would yield an understanding of its ability to gain adherents. It’s likely that many non-rational knowledge narratives contain elements of “truth” mixed with exaggeration or non-verifiable statements, and this can be a large factor in how attractive the new narrative is.
Discovering the process by which it’s created would help reveal the site of knowledge creation and possibly the motivations that led to its forming. This type of knowledge, at least from my understanding, used to be created through a relatively informal process of agglomeration; a story would be told from person to person, gradually gaining explanatory force as it moved like a snowball rolling down a hill. Nowadays, it seems to take a more formal route to creation. Being more organized, it may be easier to follow and more intelligible to an outside observer.
Dissemination of this type of knowledge has also changed over time. Delivery has grown from mainly word-of-mouth to mass media, and a study of the delivery characteristics and methods of presentation may yield valuable insights.
At this point, it looks like this post has changed into a call for a media studies research paper, but I couldn’t help but think that a politically influential type of knowledge was being left unexplored in the readings for this week. Non-rational knowledge can influence the creation of scientific knowledge in much the same way rational criticisms can, especially in the political arena with which the articles dealt. In fact, I’d wager that this type of dialectical competition between rational and non-rational knowledge will continue to grow for some time in American politics, and future research of the vein in Week 5’s articles should at least cursorily address the impact that it can have.
Somewhat different to Wynne’s English sheep farmer example, in that their knowledge was seemingly developed through a rational but non-scientific process of historical trial and error, American political discourse has developed and refined the capacity to generate and deliver seemingly non-rational (or at least non-logical) knowledge narratives (think conspiracy theories). Instead of simply criticizing the mainstream consensus in an attempt to show internal flaws or lack of evidence, these new knowledge narratives present claims as a whole creation, providing an alternative to the knowledge narrative that they are meant to rebut. Although this type of knowledge creation has existed for most of history, it has become much more standardized in American political discourse recently, and may present an interesting problem to explore through the epistemological lens that was discussed specifically in Miller’s articles.
How would one begin analyzing this type of knowledge creation? An examination of the story, internal logic, and the ways that it draws on prior accepted knowledge would yield an understanding of its ability to gain adherents. It’s likely that many non-rational knowledge narratives contain elements of “truth” mixed with exaggeration or non-verifiable statements, and this can be a large factor in how attractive the new narrative is.
Discovering the process by which it’s created would help reveal the site of knowledge creation and possibly the motivations that led to its forming. This type of knowledge, at least from my understanding, used to be created through a relatively informal process of agglomeration; a story would be told from person to person, gradually gaining explanatory force as it moved like a snowball rolling down a hill. Nowadays, it seems to take a more formal route to creation. Being more organized, it may be easier to follow and more intelligible to an outside observer.
Dissemination of this type of knowledge has also changed over time. Delivery has grown from mainly word-of-mouth to mass media, and a study of the delivery characteristics and methods of presentation may yield valuable insights.
At this point, it looks like this post has changed into a call for a media studies research paper, but I couldn’t help but think that a politically influential type of knowledge was being left unexplored in the readings for this week. Non-rational knowledge can influence the creation of scientific knowledge in much the same way rational criticisms can, especially in the political arena with which the articles dealt. In fact, I’d wager that this type of dialectical competition between rational and non-rational knowledge will continue to grow for some time in American politics, and future research of the vein in Week 5’s articles should at least cursorily address the impact that it can have.
Civic epistemologies in a democracy-in-waiting country in Asia
I have mentioned the name of Burma a few times in class room discussions. In addition, in my previous blog, I also mentioned Burma as a nation-state which gained independence from its British rulers in 1948. After its independence, the country was under the democratic rule for a few years. In 1962, General Ne Win (a member of 30 commandos who fought back British) staged a coup d’état and seized the power. Under his dictatorial rule for more than 26 years, the country adopted a close-door policy and isolated itself from other countries. Burmese’s way to socialism was established with borrowing the ideas of socialism from China and Union of Soviet Russia. With socio-economic sufferings due to economic mis-management, the citizens of the Burma nation-wide participated in uprisings in 1988 and demanded the immediate dissolution of the government. Finally General Ne Win stepped down with his last speech with words “the guns will shoot you directly not to the air” spoken in a live television broadcast nationwide. After thousands of protesters were killed by the military, General Saw Maung staged second coup d’état in 1990.
In 1990, free election was held the first time in 30 years of history and National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, a Noble Laureate 1991 won the landslide victory. In the process of power transfer from military to civilian government, the military regime was divided into two camps—one to transfer smoothly and the other to remain in power. As a result, General Saw Maung was believed to be assassinated by his subordinates and his life was claimed in a helicopter crash. The country ended up with the third coup d’état again by General Than Shwe in 1992. Since then, he ruled the country for more than two decades. Aung San Suu Kyi ended up living in under house-arrest for more than 17 years out of twenty years of stay in Burma. General Than Shwe ruled the country with his iron fist. During his ruling, there were uprisings and thousands of demonstrators including monks who are highly revered were also killed.
Miller (2004) asserts that “transfers of power are, by their very nature, moments of potentially extreme political instability. Not infrequently, in many political systems, they engender small or great violence. When successful, elections serve to contain that instability (Miller 2004, 506).”
It was evident that from the time when the demonstrators demanded the General Ne Win to step down and the time General Than Shwe held the general election in 2010, the country faced extreme political instability. Those in power were observed as those who wanted to cling to the power forever. However, the story did not end here. Accordingly to Miller (2004), the transfer of power is successful, the election should limit the instability. Well, I do not see this has happened in Burma. Why? Please allow me to elaborate more.
A constitution was drafted which favored the military regime to take a strong hold in the future politics of Burma. Drafting a constitution took more than a decade. Only selected ethnic minority groups were invited in preparing the constitution and all other opposition parties were excluded. A military backed party which is led by retired generals was established for one party election in 2010. The party forced many people and its civil servants to do advance voting. The international community including United Nations asked General Than Shwe to allow the media presence in election and poll places. However, the media was not allowed. Advance votes were manipulated in tallying in order to have wining scores for pro-junta party candidates. This was evident with what Miller (2004) argues:
“At the core of this system are polling places…the citizens…administrators…machines that collects votes…the practices and technologies used to tally votes…the audit trails generated at each stage that certify individual tallies (Miller 2004, 507).”
Now the country is having its first parliamentary meeting in sessions. Two third of parliamentary seats were occupied by the retired military. A few minority leaders were given inactive positions. There is a saying “old wine in a new bottle”. However, the old government even does not bother to change a new bottle, but changing military uniform to civilian cloth is good enough for them. The creditability is needless to say “in question”. The government does not gain creditability locally and internationally. In fact, Burma is a democracy-in-waiting country in Asia with uncertainties, instabilities and underdevelopment. The only certainty is that the people there must find the ways themselves to survive at the gun point.
References
Miller, C.A. 2004. Interrogating the Civic Epistemology of American Democracy. Social Studies of Science 34(4):501-530.
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