Dislodging Science

Has science wedged itself between a rock and hard place in regards to being viewed and accepted as a creditable producer of knowledge? Does science blindly place itself in this predicament? How can science dislodge itself?

I am not saying that this happens in 100% of every single case—the readings for this week made sure that this was not the case. But it serves some purpose to understand the cases that science does this unto itself in order to help prevent or clean up after.

Brian Wynne’s article proposed that science does not show the ability to be reflexive in its position in society. In fact, it was actually the lay people (farmers) that showed they were capable to be reflexive (more than science that is).

“The issues and problems in public understanding of science thus cannot be divorced, as scientific bodies repeatedly assume they can, from the epistemological issues of the social purposes of knowledge, and what counts as ‘sound knowledge’ for difference contexts” (p 43)
What scientists seemed to overlook was that experience, judgments, and understanding of science’s organization led to how one might understand science.

The farmer’s cultural outlook was discordant with science’s culture of standardization and control. Science’s certainty did not allow for flexibility, standardization left out difference of farms, local knowledge was ignored. Watching science being conducted on their own land did not help as they saw the “true science.” They thus felt that their way of life was under threat from outsiders.

Stephen Hilgartner highlighted how scientific expertise is not the only input into creditability. It seemed at the Academy both tried to cover those elements that might hurt their credibility and/or didn’t know/ignored that other inputs were possible. For example, they tried to keep disagreement behind the curtain (spotlighting lack of consensus can hinder creditability). Yet, they seemed to forget that “public identities” might enlist stereotyping.

A slightly different take was done by Clark Miller who seemed to focus more on the positive than the negative in regards to science’s location in society. American civic epistemology’s attention on “seeing is believing” still exists even though many tried to refute this during the 2000 election: “The ideal goal is to establish a transparent process that will create public confidence in the final vote tally” (p414). Nonetheless, this transparency can come with some risk for any indiscretions can be exploited.

What can be done to help science free itself when it gets stuck—better yet, prevent itself from being stuck—in these situations? It seems as though the recommendations (explicitly or in explicitly given) range from immediate to long term response. Wynne emphasizes how understanding local history is necessary. A lot of miscommunication and conflict can be prevented if science understood the society it’s operating in (in essence, avoiding culture shock!). Hilgartner can teach science how their norms and values aren’t necessarily the same as society and that sweeping everything under the rug is not a way to gain creditability. Miller talked about mass media coverage importance by stating how knowledge is collective” via mass media (pg519)—I have issues though on how collective it can be with such a divergence of news outlets broadcasting a wide range of “opinions”.

In regards to long-term action, Miller’s article becomes useful. He states that “dynamic social arrangements and institutions” allow for creditability in resolution (p507). In other words: democratic values! It is in this environment that “civic epistemology” can thrive as political communities create, discuss, and validated relevant knowledge via social and institutional practices (p1896).

In short, science needs to act now and deal with the “small” and “simple” issues in the short run while creating and supporting a democratic environment for long-term changes to occur. Sounds easy enough, right?