Values-Science Connection

Is science value free, as its practitioners have advocated and attempted to portray throughout a large part of its existence? Is science so heavily laden with values and normative judgments that it’s rendered impure, and must be considered to be equal with all other forms of knowledge creation, as others may say? Or can science be a mixture of the two, having a place for objectivity and values, and allowing a greater berth for democratic accountability?

The issue of the normative basis and inherent values of science has piqued my interest during this semester in particular. Science, contrary to how most people who haven’t studied it tend to view it, is certainly not a value-free enterprise; but, does the fact that it is not value- and norm-free make it useless or, perhaps, even dangerous? Some of the literature (outside of this class, I’m careful to note) seems to suggest so. This literature has made a point of examining the destructive side of science, indicating that this destructive side is congruent with its overall nature. The main accusation seems to be that, as a consequence of science’s progression from analysis to prediction to control, that inevitably it will infringe on freedom as it is applied increasingly to human affairs.

I was hoping that Douglas’ work would begin to sort out some of these criticisms of science and, in a way, it did. Douglas’ argument acknowledging what most of us already know, that science inherently contains values which can’t be completely purged, provides a space that allows for tweaking these basic inherent values. Combined with the call for a greater democratic role in problem and method construction, Douglas may have found at least a partial way out of the above criticisms. Although she’s likely not the only one to write about this kind of solution, and the actual mechanics of increasing democratic representation in the problem and method construction phases are likely to be very messy, it at least admits some kind of a solution to the danger that science can present to human freedom. If the citizenry have more of a role in defining the problems that scientists work on and the methods they use to investigate those problems and create solutions, it’s likely that they won’t argue for solutions that oppress and control them.

But much the same in my previous blog entry about Brown’s book, how do we actually accomplish this democratic integration in these, as Douglas refers to them, ‘direct value’ phases? On what level of problem do we appeal to the citizenry for their input? Should we only seek their input when the stakes are high, or should we include a representative subset of the population in nearly all substantial research projects? Should we get direct democratic input on broad national initiatives, or should local citizen panels be consulted when researchers apply for IRB approval? Who’s considered a representative citizen? These questions, along with many others, would need to be answered before implementing the general approach that Douglas outlines in her book. I may have been happier to hear her explore these questions in more detail than she did, but overall I do think her work makes a valuable attempt at addressing the values-science connection.